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Military coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the army’s cor-
porate interests are threatened. However, these conditions are also frequently present in situa-
tions in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of
these propositions. In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate
interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high
politics. Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal
cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organi-
zational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best
explanation for Russian military passivity. The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a
study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999. Studying nonevents, and moving beyond
the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic
politics.
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Coups are the ultimate problem of civil-military relations. The coupwas the most frequent method for changing executive power in most of
the world in the 1960s and 1970s. Recent coups in Pakistan, the Ivory Coast,
and Ecuador demonstrate that despite the decline in military intervention in
the aftermath of the “third wave” of democratization, the phenomenon is
alive and well. All three of these coups came about due to state weakness,
threats to the armies’ corporate interests, or some combination of these two.
Specific reasons for the interventions included economic crises, military
budget cuts, peace deals opposed by the high command, political unrest, fail-
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ure to pay army wages, the dismissal of military leaders, and civilian corrup-
tion (“Coup leader,” 1999; Dugger, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Rohter, 2000a,
2000b; “Troops Overthrow,” 1999; Weisman, 1999).
All of these conditions have been present in Russia in the past decade. A
weak state and a military whose corporate interests are threatened are also the
very conditions that the classic civil-military relations literature maintains
lead to coups. Not surprisingly, then, many observers in both Russia and
abroad have warned of the dangers of a military coup.1 For example, former
Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar (“Gaydar,” 1998) remarked in September
1998, “We have a good many generals who are ready to don Pinochet’s
uniform.”2
Why have these predictions of military intervention proved unfounded in
Russia? The dominant social science explanations for military intervention—
domestic structure and corporate interest accounts—would predict a military
coup. These perspectives, however, have been a poor guide to understanding
Russian military behavior. They also neglect ways in which the army can play
a decisive role in high politics without seizing state power.
I argue that the best explanation for Russian military passivity is the orga-
nizational culture of the army, which sees intervention in high politics as
inappropriate. An alternative explanation—that the officer corps has not
intervened despite a common interest in doing so because of organizational
structural barriers—is intuitively plausible. However, a broader comparative
perspective shows that these obstacles have not prevented coups in other
states.
This article proceeds in the following fashion. First, I define military inter-
vention and discuss the following four alternative theoretical approaches to
military coups: domestic structure, corporate interest, organizational struc-
ture, and organizational culture. Second, I examine the evidence for the four
accounts and demonstrate that organizational culture provides the best expla-
nation for the Russian military’s recent political behavior. Third, I use the
October 1993 crisis in Moscow as a more detailed case for process-tracing
military behavior, showing how organizational culture affected the army’s
choices. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of how the different theo-
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1. At a conference of American and Russian specialists on Russian civil-military relations
in early 1997 (Stanglin et al., 1997, pp. 23-24), the Russian participants thought that the proba-
bility of “a coup, chaos, or disintegration of the Russian military within the next 12 to 18 months”
was 60%, with some putting the probability at 100%. The Americans concluded that the proba-
bility of one of these bleak outcomes was 30% to 40%.
2. See also similar statements by Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov (“Zyuganov,”
1998) and former General and current Governor Alexander Lebed (“Lebed,” 1998).
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retical perspectives may complement each other and to what degree military
intervention remains a threat in Russia.
EXPLAINING MILITARY INTERVENTION
The notion of a military coup evokes images of soldiers with machine
guns seizing television and radio transmitters and surrounding government
buildings with armored vehicles. In reality, the military can have a decisive
influence in what Colton (1990) labels “sovereign power” issues, or the ques-
tion of who rules the state, in several different ways. A dichotomous coding
of coup/noncoup is inadequate in many cases.
There are three possible codings for the dependent variable of military
involvement in sovereign power issues. The first is the traditional focus of
much of the civil-military relations literature, military intervention. Military
intervention is the use, actual or threatened, of force by members of the mili-
tary, either alone or with civilian actors, in an attempt to change the executive
leadership of the state (Finer, 1975; Luttwak, 1979; Nordlinger, 1977).
The second possible coding is military resolution of a civilian sovereign
power dispute, or military arbitration. Military arbitration occurs when mul-
tiple persons or groups claim to hold legitimate state power, and the army is
forced to decide whose orders to obey. This is different than military inter-
vention because the military has not made an autonomous decision to
become involved in sovereign power issues but is forced to play a role due to
civilian activity. Military arbitration is a case of military involvement in sov-
ereign power issues but not one of military intervention. This category of mil-
itary behavior has been ignored in the civil-military relations literature.3
The third possible coding of the dependent variable is no military involve-
ment in sovereign power issues. This potential coding is crucial and often
overlooked. Much of the existing literature on military intervention studies
only coups and ignores noncoups, thereby introducing selection bias into the
research design (Geddes, 1990; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).
The army can also play a role in other domains of civil-military inter-
action, such as defense politics (doctrine, budgets, etc.) or non–sovereign
power domestic political issues (e.g., economic policy). Such military partic-
ipation often represents normal bureaucratic politics, but sometimes such
activity is unsanctioned and thus a potential threat to civilian control. This
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3. A historical example is the December 1851 coup of French President Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte (Ralston, 1967); a more recent example was the Ecuadorian crisis of February 1997
(“Ecuador’s Post-Modern Coup,” 1997).
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behavior, although important, should be distinguished from military involve-
ment in resolving a sovereign power issue, the central concern of this article.
The two most frequent explanations for military coups are the domestic
structure and corporate interest approaches. These perspectives have consid-
erable merit, but they suffer from rarely being applied to cases of noncoups
(the proverbial dog that doesn’t bark). Organizational structure and organiza-
tional culture arguments are less well-known explanations but should be part
of our standard civil-military relations repertoire.
DOMESTIC STRUCTURE
The domestic structure perspective posits that military intervention
occurs because low state political capacity provides the army with opportuni-
ties to become involved in politics. A domestic structure approach to military
intervention highlights the armed forces’ position in relation to the strength
of other government institutions and other societal actors. Military interven-
tion is simply the most dramatic of extrainstitutional means that actors adopt
to influence policy in a weakly institutionalized, praetorian state (Finer,
1975; Huntington, 1968).
This explanation has considerable merit and has been used to explain mili-
tary intervention or its absence in a wide variety of states (e.g., Margiotta,
1976; Yalman, 1968). However, much of this literature is sampled on the
dependent variable—that is, only coups are studied and not noncoups. Yet
states and societies often experience structural weakness without provoking
military intervention. Goldsworthy (1981, p. 50) observes, “the kinds of fea-
tures said to give rise to coup-proneness are often just as characteristic of the
polities where coups have not occurred.”
This approach could be strengthened with greater attention to the differ-
ence between military intervention and military arbitration. A more nuanced
version of the domestic structure argument would maintain that political
incapacity makes military involvement in sovereign power issues more
likely, but not necessarily military intervention. I suggest below that organi-
zational culture is a key factor that determines whether a military directly
intervenes or tries to leave resolution of these political disputes to civilians.
Domestic structure, then, is not a sufficient explanation for military inter-
vention. Indeed, by focusing on the opportunity for intervention at the state
level, these approaches tend to ignore the motives for intervention at the mili-
tary level.4 A complete explanation of a military’s behavior requires an inves-
tigation of its internal processes. The remaining three approaches—corporate
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interest, organizational structure, and organizational culture—focus their
efforts on explaining why military officers make the political choices they do.
CORPORATE INTEREST
The corporate interest approach to military intervention focuses on the
bureaucratic motives of the armed forces. Armies are assumed to respond in a
rational way to their environment, endeavoring to reduce uncertainty and to
maximize the things all organizations seek: power, resources, and autonomy
(Allison, 1971; Downs, 1967; Posen, 1984). The most common explanation
for coups at the organizational level is that intervention is caused by corporate
motives—the desire to protect or enhance the military’s resources or posi-
tion. Corporate interests, Nordlinger (1977) argues, have played a prominent
role in military intervention in such diverse states as Peru, Ghana, Egypt, and
Honduras. Thompson (1973) came to similar conclusions in his large-N sta-
tistical study of all military coups between 1946 and 1970.
The corporate interest approach to military intervention has received con-
siderable attention from scholars working in a single-country context (e.g.,
O’Donnell, 1986). This perspective was also the one most consistently
advanced in the study of Soviet civil-military relations, particularly in the
work of Kolkowicz (1967) and Colton (1979).5 Colton (1979, p. 240) states,
“officers intervene against civilian authorities when their perceived interests
are being denied or threatened by civilian policy.”
The corporate interest approach also has much to recommend it, but it suf-
fers from the same weakness as the domestic structure approach: It is sam-
pled on the dependent variable. Thompson (1973) notes that the types of mili-
tary grievances present in coups also exist in states that do not experience
military intervention. Whether corporate grievances lead to intervention
depends not only on domestic structure but also on other factors internal to
the armed forces.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Even if the army as a whole might benefit from military intervention, it
still may be difficult to put together a coup. Domestic structure arguments
focus on the balance of power within the state; the organizational structure
approach looks at the balance of power within the military itself, as well as
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5. Colton (1979) challenged Kolkowicz’s (1965) view that Soviet civil-military relations
were inherently conflictual, but he shared with Kolkowicz a focus on the interests of the armed
forces as an explanation for officer corps behavior; their disagreement was more empirical than
theoretical.
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that between it and other armed state bodies. This perspective partially builds
on a collective action logic.
Coup decisions are influenced by collective action logic, but they are not
pure examples of a social dilemma (Green & Shapiro, 1994; Olson, 1965).
Control of the state is not a pure public good, like clean air, because the bene-
fits of it, such as power and wealth, are excludable. To the extent that material
incentives motivate military intervention, the major spoils will be grabbed by
the conspirators themselves, although the army in general also may benefit.
Moreover, the structure of the situation mitigates the collective action
dilemma. Armies rely on coercion and hierarchy, coups arise in small con-
spiratorial groups, the decisions of a handful of officers can often tip the
scales, and plotters are able to provide selective incentives (side payments) to
other participants. Organizing a coup, then, is closer to what Green and Shapiro
(1994) call a “quasi-dilemma” (pp. 77-78; also see Olson, 1965, pp. 2, 44-46)
than a pure collective action problem.
Consequently the incentives for rational individual officers are more com-
plex than in the conventional collective action dilemma. Doing nothing is
often not the optimal strategy for officers during a coup attempt. Tullock
(1974) reasons that neutrality will be punished by the winning side, so the
trick for an individual officer is to figure out which side will win and commit
to it early enough that his participation is rewarded. Civil-military relations
specialists also have pointed to strong personal incentives, including the pos-
sibility of power and wealth, to participate in coups (Decalo, 1990; Finer,
1975; Thompson, 1973). Clearly there are both potential benefits and major
risks involved in any coup, so a generalized claim about individual self-inter-
est needs to be linked to more specific claims that can explain variation in
military intervention across time and space. Two different variants of an orga-
nizational structure argument set out specific conditions likely to exacerbate
collective action barriers to military intervention.
The first argument states that internal divisions within the military
decrease the likelihood of coups. These divisions could be, for example,
between junior and senior officers, along political lines, between services
(i.e., army vs. air force), or ethnic or class based (Aguero, 1995; Janowitz,
1977). The empirical literature, however, shows that coups are at least as
likely when militaries are internally divided as when they have a high degree
of internal cohesion (Cox, 1976; Thompson, 1976). For example, in a meta-
analysis of existing quantitative studies, Zimmerman (1983) states, “lower
cohesion of the military will lead to increases in coup frequency” (p. 278).
Although internal divisions may complicate the planning of a coup, they are
not an insurmountable barrier to military intervention and in fact can serve as
an impetus for a coup.
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A second argument about barriers to officer corps action focuses on
“counterbalancing” by paramilitary or security bodies (Frazer, 1994). Such a
strategy by the political leadership could complicate coup plotting, espe-
cially if these other bodies are large enough or perceived as particularly loyal
to the government. Counterbalancing arguably has helped keep Saddam
Hussein in power, as it did for Hafez Al-Asad, despite a history of coups in
Iraq and Syria (Quinlivan, 1999). Luttwak (1979), however, reports that (as
of the late 1970s) there were no cases of a paramilitary body actually defend-
ing the government once a coup attempt was under way.6
Organizational structure, then, could serve as a barrier to military inter-
vention even if there are strong corporate motives for a coup, by complicating
collective action. However, the empirical support for the two specific ver-
sions of this argument is weak. Moreover, by focusing on the distribution of
material power within the army, this approach neglects potentially important
normative restraints against intervention.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
An organizational culture argument maintains that the beliefs and values
of the officer corps explain its behavior in sovereign power issues.7 This
approach, unlike the previous three, does not assume that all individuals or
groups will behave in like fashion when confronted with similar objective cir-
cumstances (i.e., actors are not treated as having identical preferences). The
aspect of a military’s organizational culture that is most relevant to the study
of involvement in sovereign power issues is the set of beliefs held by officers
about their proper relationship to the political leadership.8 In other words,
what norms are held by officers on the question of who should rule the state?9
The organizational culture perspective stresses the unique experiences in
the life of an organization as an explanation for subsequent behavior (Ott,
1989; Schein, 1984; Smircich, 1983).10 Institutional lessons learned in
response to critical events in the life of an organization powerfully shape the
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6. A recent exception could be the Basra uprising in Iraq in the spring of 1992, to the extent
that military units were involved.
7. Organizational culture is the pattern of assumptions and values held by members of an
organization that help them make sense of the world and orient their choices (Gagliardi, 1986;
Schein, 1984; Smircich, 1983).
8. Culture is often treated as a single or unified concept, although it is more a metaconcept
than a single variable. Thus it is not necessary to map all aspects of a group’s culture but only
those relevant to the specific empirical question (Jepperson & Swidler, 1994).
9. Norms are collective expectations about appropriate behavior.
10. The concept of organizational culture has been applied productively to the study of mili-
tary organizations by Kier (1997) and Legro (1995), although they focus on military doctrine.
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outlook of an organization’s members. Events are defined as critical due to
their place in history, their role in the development of organizational beliefs,
or their metaphorical power (Feldman, 1984; March, Sproul, & Tamuz,
1991). Because of the socialization processes that operate within organiza-
tions, dominant interpretations of these events tend to develop, although
some subgroups and individuals may draw different lessons. Organizational
socialization is particularly likely to lead to a dominant interpretation in a
hierarchical organization such as the military (Kier, 1997).
Restraints on military intervention will be higher before the first coup than
during subsequent interventions. In a country with a tradition of military
intervention or rule, officers are less inclined to doubt their right to intervene
in politics. As Hibbs (1973, p.189) states, “an ‘interventionist’ history is
likely to develop a tradition or ‘culture’ that makes current interventions
more likely than otherwise would be the case.” On the other hand, a failed
coup attempt (Horowitz, 1980) or a disastrous period of military rule (Fitch,
1998) may strengthen officer corps’ inhibitions against military intervention.
Militaries also learn organizational lessons from events other than coups,
such as wars, domestic usage for police-type missions, mutinies, and major
organizational or personnel changes.
Although some scholars have emphasized cultural and ideational factors
in their historical accounts (e.g., Abenheim, 1988), most theoretical explana-
tions of military intervention emphasize structural and rational reasons for
coups. The question of officer corps norms, however, has not been entirely
ignored, although this work does not draw on the organizational culture liter-
ature.11 Fitch (1977, 1998) offers the best and most comprehensive test of the
importance of officer corps norms, or what he calls “role beliefs,” in his work
on the Ecuadorian and Argentinean armed forces. Using interviews and sur-
vey data, Fitch shows that the role beliefs of Ecuadorian officers changed
from the 1950s to the 1960s and demonstrates how this changing role defini-
tion led to greater military intervention in politics. Similarly, in Argentina,
norms against military intervention have spread in the officer corps since the
1980s. Most interesting, perhaps, in light of the January 2000 coup, is Fitch’s
(1998) finding that “Ecuadorian officers are divided and uncertain regarding
their political role, with no single dominant perspective” (p. 72).
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taries has sometimes been read as an organizational culture explanation, but his definition of pro-
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military intervention (Finer, 1975; Stepan, 1973) unless professionalism is defined in a way that
makes the purported link between professionalism and voluntary subordination tautological
(Feaver, 1996).
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An organizational culture approach to military involvement in sovereign
power issues, then, focuses on the norms held by officers on the question of
who should rule the state. Actors’ behavior cannot be understood simply with
reference to their forward-looking utility calculations; their socially formed
subjective understandings and values also must be considered. Armies with
different norms will respond differently (intervene or not intervene) to the
same stimuli. In addition, norms often serve as a guide to action under condi-
tions of uncertainty (Elster, 1989).
RUSSIAN MILITARY BEHAVIOR, 1992-1999
This section discusses the empirical evidence for the four alternative per-
spectives on military intervention, as applied to the Russian armed forces
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The weakness of the Russian state and
the multiple attacks on military corporate interests provide both the opportu-
nity and the motive for army intervention. Organizational structure repre-
sents a potential barrier to intervention, but the most important obstacle has
been continuing commitment to a norm of civilian supremacy in the Russian
officer corps.
DOMESTIC STRUCTURE
The Russian state today is extremely weak. The weakness of the Soviet
state in its last years was dramatically confirmed by its collapse in December
1991. The successor Russian state is plagued by similar problems, and many
observers have predicted that Russia is likely to disintegrate as well (Jensen,
1999; Stern, 1994).
A series of indicators of political capacity (Jackman, 1993; Krasner, 1978;
Migdal, 1988) demonstrates the weakness of the post-Soviet Russian state.
Russia is a new state, with a new constitution, that has undergone only one
change in executive leadership since 1991 (and this took place with the ir-
regular circumstance of President Boris Yel’tsin’s surprise resignation). This
“liability of newness” facing the Russian state, highlighted in the literature on
organizational and political development (Jackman, 1993), has led to sharp
political conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of power.
The rules, norms, and divisions of power governing these relations are still
highly uncertain (McFaul, 1998).
Several other indicators also suggest the weak political capacity of the
new Russian state. The inability of the state to collect taxes or to enforce fed-
eral laws at the regional level, and the absence of real political parties, are
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obvious signs of this weakness (Hanson & Kopstein, 1997; Stoner-Weiss,
1998). The Russian state has also been unable to resist private pressure in key
decision spheres. For example, enterprise managers were able to hijack the
state’s privatization program in pursuit of their own interests (McFaul, 1995).
The weakness of the Russian state prevents it from fulfilling its most basic
functions, including collecting taxes, paying its own employees, and enforc-
ing laws and the constitution.
The domestic structure approach, then, would lead one to predict military
intervention. This has not happened. However, distinguishing between mili-
tary involvement and military intervention does account for the October 1993
events, discussed below, when the army was dragged into a civilian sovereign
power dispute.
CORPORATE INTEREST
The dominant approach to the study of Soviet civil-military relations, as
noted above, was the corporate interest perspective. This argument was
embraced by other scholars in the early Yel’tsin years. Zisk (1993, p. 17), for
example, argued in March 1993,
An anti-Yel’tsin coup may thus become likely if Yel’tsin proves either unwill-
ing to meet military demands or unable to solve the social, economic, and
corporatist problems officers now face. Yel’tsin must demonstrate, continu-
ally, both sympathy toward the military and competence as the crisis in Russian
society continues. If he does not, the patience of the Russian General Staff may
very well snap.
Yel’tsin, it is clear in hindsight, did not live up to these criteria. The Rus-
sian army’s corporate interests have been seriously undermined in the past
decade. The military’s decline, which began under Mikhail Gorbachev,
accelerated under Yel’tsin and has continued apace with little sign of a turn-
around in the near future. Lieven (1996) states flatly, “the Russian army today
is weaker than it has been for almost 400 years” (p. 24).
These signs of weakness are diverse and wide ranging. Two basic indica-
tors of corporate interest, organizational size and budget, show clear evi-
dence of an organization under threat. In the 9 years since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the size of the Russian armed forces has dropped by almost two
thirds (see Figure 1). Similarly, since 1992, the military budget has been
slashed by 62% (see Figure 2).12
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If anything, these figures understate the extent of decline, particularly in
terms of the budget. According to some estimates, Russian defense spending
has declined from $142 billion in 1992 to $4 billion in 1999, a 98% decrease.
Moreover, actual expenditures in the past 7 years have rarely if ever reached
the budgeted amount. For example, in 1998, actual expenditures were only
55% of planned allocations. Although Yel’tsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin,
has paid lip service to military needs, his government has proposed to cut
many military financial credits, such as free public transport and untaxed
wages, and the military budget remains below the levels mandated by
Yel’tsin (Korbut, 2000; Manyukov, 1999; Mikhaylov, 2000).
Across a range of issues, the military is in a state of crisis, including hous-
ing, manpower, social support, training, and supplies. More than 125,000
officers do not have their own apartments. For several years, more than 70%
of officers were regularly paid late, not receiving their salaries for months at a
time. Military units have had electricity and telephone service cut off for lack
of payment. Many units spend much of their time simply struggling to sur-
vive, not engaged in military training (“Kapitany,” 1998; Korbut, 1998;
“Ofitsery,” 1998; Rokhlin, 1998).
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Figure 1: Drop in number of Russian military personnel from 1992 to 1999.
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The situation became so bad that in 1998, the Defense Ministry issued
instructions on foraging for food in the forest, and some units were supplied
with dog food (Saradzhyan, 1998). The military leadership has complained
bitterly about the hardships inflicted on a once-mighty army. In February
1997, then Defense Minister Igor Rodionov (“Voyennaya tayna,” 1997)
stated, “What sort of defense minister am I? I am the minister of a disintegrat-
ing army and dying navy.” General Lev Rokhlin (Shargorodsky, 1997), the
former chair of the parliament’s defense committee, stated in February 1997
that “if this happened to the army of a well-to-do country, there would have
been a military coup long ago.”
Rokhlin was not versed in civil-military relations theory, but he intuitively
understood the claim made by much of the comparative, Soviet, and post-
Soviet literature: Armies whose interests are consistently ignored will be
inclined to intervene. The corporate interest approach, then, performs the
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worst of the four being considered; the Russian political leadership under
Yel’tsin did not cater to military interests, but the officer corps remained
passive.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Internal divisions within the army is one of the most commonly advanced
explanations for Russian military passivity. Political, generational, socioeco-
nomic, and regional cleavages are said to prevent concerted action, despite a
common interest among officers in rectifying their material plight (Barany,
1999; Mendeloff, 1994).
The counterbalancing argument is also frequently invoked to explain mili-
tary inaction. Lieven (1998) maintains that President Yel’tsin pursued a strat-
egy of “divide and rule” designed to reduce the threat of military intervention.
Experts suggest that the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) and the Presidential Security Service have been beefed up, whereas
the army has been allowed to atrophy as a way of strengthening Yel’tsin’s
rule. Galeotti (1997) argues that “an intricate balance of terror” has been cre-
ated that prevents coup attempts. The Federal Security Service, the successor
to the KGB, also continues to place agents inside the army to monitor the offi-
cer corps.
All of these factors would certainly complicate the plotting of praetorian
Russian officers. It is not clear, however, whether they are sufficient in them-
selves to deter a coup attempt. Reports about the strengthening of the MVD
Internal Troops, for example, are at best overstated and at worst simply
wrong—these troops also have shrunk considerably since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, just not as fast as the regular army (Taylor, 1999). Moreover,
many MVD officers were trained and served in the armed forces, including
several of the Internal Troops’ commanders in the past decade, and would be
very reluctant to take up arms against former comrades (V. Solovyev, per-
sonal communication, June 16, 2000). The very appointment of army officers
to head the Internal Troops calls into question the divide-and-rule argument.
Federal Security Service agents, like those in many other armies, engage pri-
marily in counterintelligence, not political monitoring. And the old political
officers, or commissars, from the Soviet period do not exist. In general, the
amount of political oversight of the officer corps has declined in the past
decade. Finally, regular army units and troops from the MVD or the secret
police have not been used in a counterbalancing role against each other since
1953, shortly after the death of Stalin. Much more common has been their
joint use on the same side of a crisis.
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Other knowledgeable observers believe the difficulties any plotter would
face are seriously overstated. Felgengauer (1998), Russia’s best known mili-
tary correspondent, maintained
If a local military commander based a few hundred kilometers from Moscow
were to rebel and demand Yel’tsin’s resignation, he would gain support from
other units, from the local population, and also the Russian parliament. Such a
wildcat military rebellion in Russia could easily trigger a successful coup.
The most serious objection to accepting that organizational structure is an
overwhelming barrier to military intervention is that these impediments have
not prevented coups in a range of other states. Qualitative and quantitative
studies of military coups have shown that divided armies intervene as fre-
quently as unified ones. Paramilitary and security forces can be neutralized.
Granted, it is probably easier to overcome these barriers in a country that has
a tradition of military intervention, where examples of successful military
coups are in the minds not only of the plotters but of their potential opponents.
But this only brings us to the question, Why does the Russian army not have
this tradition?
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
An examination of Russian military culture, based on its history, polling
data, publications, and officers’ statements, shows that a well-entrenched
belief that the army should be “outside politics” exists. This norm has served
as an important barrier to military intervention.
The Russian army was not always apolitical.13 In the 18th century, Russian
officers intervened repeatedly in sovereign power issues, deposing tsars and
installing new ones. The last successful military coup in Russia took place in
1801, when Paul I was dethroned. The failed Decembrist uprising of 1825,
which was spearheaded by a group of politically ambitious junior and mid-
level officers, was a key institutional lesson for Russian officers, demonstrat-
ing the risks of a failed intervention. Imperial Russia’s greatest defense min-
ister, Dmitriy Milyutin (1861-1881), successfully reoriented the Russian
army toward external threats and sharply diminished the involvement of offi-
cers in domestic politics and administration (Keep, 1985).
The Russian Revolution of 1917 was made possible in part by a military
leadership that was fixated on the war effort and had little desire to get
dragged into the political revolution at home. The so-called Kornilov affair in
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August 1917 was a sovereign power crisis precipitated by the accusations of
Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky that army commander Lavr Kornilov
was guilty of planning a coup and treason. Kornilov had not in fact been plan-
ning to seize power, but Kerensky’s accusation drove him into open rebellion,
and Kornilov and several other leading officers were arrested. Most officers,
however, sat out the affair (Katkov, 1980; Munck, 1987). Even after the
Bolsheviks took power, the vast majority of officers tried to remain politi-
cally neutral, despite the hostility displayed by Lenin and his followers
toward the army. It took defeat in a major war and the dismemberment of the
country to bring about concerted military intervention during the civil war,
and large numbers of imperial army officers served with the Bolsheviks, hav-
ing concluded that they now represented legitimate civilian rule (Jones,
1976).
Soviet officers, like their late-Imperial counterparts, were inculcated with
the notion that they had no role to play in sovereign power issues. The
supremacy of the Communist Party over the army was a persistent feature of
Soviet politics. Even during Stalin’s murderous purges of the officer corps in
1937-1938, in which thousands of officers were killed, the military did noth-
ing to protect itself from this onslaught. The one case of military intervention
was the August 1991 coup attempt, which was undertaken to prevent the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. The putsch, which was organized by the head of the
KGB and included the minister of defense, minister of internal affairs, prime
minister, and vice president in its ranks, failed largely due to the unwilling-
ness of high-ranking army officers to use force against civilian coup oppo-
nents. In December 1991, the officer corps remained passive and let the
Soviet Union disintegrate (Taylor, in press-b).
Thus when the Russian state was created in 1992, the apolitical tradition
of the officer corps stretched back more than 150 years. Only during the
extreme cases of state collapse, in 1917 and 1991, did elements of the officer
corps violate organizational norms against military intervention. Normative
commitments, however, made military behavior weak, halfhearted, and con-
sequently ineffective. Domestic structure pressures were severe and clearly
played an important role in making intervention more likely. Corporate inter-
est considerations were not important in these intervention decisions, and
organizational structure was a less important barrier to army action than orga-
nizational culture. This cultural disposition has remained remarkably robust
during the tumultuous 1990s.
Polling data represent perhaps the most straightforward method of access-
ing subjective beliefs. The Russian officer corps has been polled on multiple
occasions in the past decade. These data show a consistent aversion to a mili-
tary role in high politics. In a number of polls conducted between 1992
938 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2001
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
(Makarov, 1992; Zalesskiy, 1992) and 1997, large majorities (from 75% to
90%) of officers have stated their view that the army should not become
involved in politics and their opposition to military rule. For example, in a
U.S. Information Agency survey (Grant, 1997) of 1,200 Russian officers in
May 1997, 78% of those polled stated that the military should not be involved
in domestic politics. A major poll (Ball & Gerber, 1996, p. 166) conducted in
1995 concluded, “The majority of officers we interviewed displayed an
unmistakably democratic orientation.” In a poll conducted in 1994 (The Mili-
tary Elite in Russia, 1994), officers rated full Russian membership in NATO
within the next 2 years more likely than a military coup.
These polling data demonstrate how fallacious comparisons of the Rus-
sian military to Third World and Latin American militaries are (e.g., Blank,
1998). Data on the Ecuadorian military from the 1950s and 1960s, for exam-
ple, showed that less than 20% of officers believed that military involvement
in domestic politics was illegitimate (Fitch, 1977), in sharp contrast to the
opinions of Russian officers today.14
Another important aspect of Russian military organizational culture is the
widely held belief that the army’s primary task is defense of the state against
external attack. Polls in recent years have found a majority of officers against
using the military for internal tasks, including domestic policing missions.
The only internal missions that consistently gain support are in cases of natu-
ral disasters or nuclear power accidents (Ball, 1996; The Military Elite in
Russia, 1994). The first Chechen War (1994-1996) was perceived by many
officers as an internal policing mission and encountered serious opposition
from many high-ranking officers (Lieven, 1998). In contrast, the second
Chechen War, begun in 1999 and continuing today, came about after an attack
by Chechen rebels on a neighboring Russian republic and has been seen by
both military and civilian elites as a legitimate defense of the state’s territorial
integrity. Current officer support for the war does not imply a willingness to
become involved in sovereign power issues.
This aversion to involvement in sovereign power issues also has been
demonstrated in the statements of the military leadership and in the indoctri-
nation materials of the armed forces. Russia’s first minister of defense after
independence, Pavel Grachev, reiterated continuously during his 4 years in
office that the military should be “outside politics.” Grachev (Dokuchayev,
1992) clearly stated this position in December 1992: “The army should be
outside politics, and the leadership of the armed forces will not permit it to be
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dragged into politics. Soldiers do not want to become hostages, or even more
so participants in any political games” (p. 3).
Officers in military publications stress the tradition of subordination to
civilian authority in the Russian and Soviet armed forces. Bel’kov (1992,
p. 26) noted that the Russian army “does not have putschist traditions, and
also no putschist inclinations.” Rodachin (1993, pp. 13-14) argued that the
tradition of civil-military relations in a country has a major influence on the
stance of the officer corps. Prerevolutionary Russia, observed Rodachin, had
“firm traditions of soldierly obedience, inspired by the ideas of faithful ser-
vice to the tsar and fatherland.” Similarly, he continued, in the Soviet period,
the army was “unquestionably subordinate [to] the institutions of power con-
trolled and directed by the party.”
Russian military journals remained focused on narrow military issues
throughout the late Soviet and early postindependence period. The over-
whelming majority of articles in the main army journal, Military Herald,
from 1985 to 1993 were about traditional military questions such as tactics,
training, personnel issues, and military history; less than three tenths of one
percent dealt with internal security questions. This fixation on narrow techni-
cal issues is particularly notable during a period of state collapse. In contrast,
the French military in the 1950s (Ambler, 1968) and the Brazilian army in the
1950s and 1960s (Stepan, 1971) began to focus more on internal threats and
“counter-revolutionary war” in their journals, a shift in orientation that
pointed to a changing organizational culture with a more praetorian out-
look.15
Consistent with an organizational culture account, Russian officers point
to the lessons learned from critical events that reinforced norms of civilian
supremacy. The disastrous use of the military for internal missions in Tbilisi,
Georgia, in April 1989 and Vilnius, Lithuania, in January 1991 reinforced
officers’ views that playing an active role in domestic politics was not the
army’s job and would only damage the military’s reputation. The military
newspaper Red Star (“U armii,” 1993), for example, emphasized institutional
lessons and their influence on the officer corps:
In the last few years [the army] has learned a great deal. So many times it has
been set up and betrayed. There was Afghanistan, and Tbilisi, and Vilnius, and
the August putsch of 1991. The bitter experience received in the burden of
these dramas, of course, had its effect. And if there are some political forces or
leaders that even theoretically consider the use of military force in the resolu-
tion of internal political problems, they need to think about this.
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In summary, the dominant organizational culture of the Russian armed
forces, based on a wide range of data, demonstrates a strong commitment to a
norm of civilian supremacy and the belief that officers should not be involved
in sovereign power issues.
The organizational culture of the Russian officer corps, however, is not
monolithic. As the polling data suggest, there is an organizational subculture
(around 10%-20% of the officer corps) with a more praetorian stance. This
cohort bases its stance on the multiple humiliations experienced by the army
in the past decade, including the collapse of the Soviet state and the repeated
blows to the army’s corporate interests catalogued above.16
A series of pretenders, with varying degrees of seriousness, have put
themselves forward as a Russian “man on horseback” during the past 8 years.
Most recently, in the summer of 1997, General Rokhlin (1997) charged that
Yel’tsin was responsible for the collapse of the army, called on Yel’tsin to
resign, and announced that he was forming a Movement in Support of the
Army that would rally the people and push Yel’tsin from power. Many
observers took this threat seriously, but the movement has little support (it
received .59% of the vote in December 1999 Duma elections) and Rokhlin
himself was killed in the summer of 1998 in a domestic dispute. A U.S. State
Department report (1999) concluded “attempts to organize the armed forces
into opposition movements . . . have fizzled after receiving little support from
the armed forces and have had negligible impact on Russia’s political order.”
Of course, creating a public movement is the opposite strategy from orga-
nizing a coup. To the extent that Russian officers have been involved in Rus-
sian domestic politics, it has been to lobby for military interests within legally
available channels. When Russian officers run for public office, for example,
it implies an acceptance of the democratic process, not its rejection.17
SUMMARY
Four different theoretical approaches have been tested against Russian
military behavior in the Yel’tsin era (1992 to 1999). Consistent with organi-
zational structure and organizational culture accounts and contrary to domes-
tic structure and corporate interest perspectives, the Russian military has not
intervened in politics. The corporate interest approach performs particularly
poorly (Table 1).
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Table 1
Predictions and Evidence of Russian Military Behavior
Predictions
Domestic Corporate Organizational Organizational
Observations Structure Interest Structure Culture Outcome
1992 to 1999 Intervention or Intervention likely Intervention unlikely Intervention unlikely No intervention
arbitration likely One arbitration
October 1993 events Intervention or Intervention likely Intervention unlikely Intervention unlikely Arbitration
arbitration likely If arbitration, If arbitration, If arbitration, Sided with most
will side with internal split or first choice is legitimate contender
contender most counterbalancing neutrality, second after initial neutrality
likely to protect possible choice is to side Internal split feared
corporate interests with most legitimate but did not take place;
contender no counterbalancing
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There was one instance of military arbitration during this period, in Octo-
ber 1993. Process tracing of this event shows that the stance adopted by the
military during the crisis was most consistent with organizational culture pre-
dictions, partially consistent with domestic and organizational structure
arguments, and inconsistent with corporate interest claims.
THE OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS
Although the military has not intervened in sovereign power issues in
post-Soviet Russia, it has been involved in high politics. In October 1993,
during his showdown with the former Supreme Soviet and his vice president,
Alexander Rutskoy, Yel’tsin called on the army to use force to suppress
armed bodies that had come out in open revolt against the Yel’tsin govern-
ment (Taylor, 1994; Taylor, in press-a). What do these events say about the
competing theories considered here?
The October 1993 crisis was a clear case of military arbitration, not mili-
tary intervention. The crisis began September 21, when Yel’tsin signed a
decree closing down the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet declared
Yel’tsin’s decree unconstitutional and appointed Rutskoy as president.
Rutskoy proceeded to appoint his own minister of defense and other top offi-
cials. The military leadership adopted a stance of neutrality during the early
phases of the crisis, declaring that they were “outside politics” and insisting,
in Garbo-esque fashion, that they wanted to be “left alone” (Maryukha, 1993;
Pavlovskiy, 1993, pp. 5, 16, 50).
Only after open violence had erupted on the streets of Moscow, with the
pro-parliamentary forces launching assaults on the mayor’s office and the
main television tower, was the army called in to put down the uprising. Ini-
tially the army reiterated its position of neutrality, asserting that MVD
Internal Troops should resolve the crisis. Yel’tsin’s military adviser, Gen-
eral Dmitriy Volkogonov (Volgonov & Kiselev, 1993), noted, “until the last
moment . . . this slogan was heard everywhere, that the army is outside poli-
tics.” Deputy Minister of Defense Col.-Gen. V. I. Mironov (1994, p. 591)
observed that the slogan “the army is outside politics . . . undoubtedly, made a
definite imprint both on societal perceptions and on the psychology of sol-
diers.” Yel’tsin (1994, p. 384) wrote in his memoirs that the government, the
military, and society “had become hostages to a pretty formula: the army is
outside politics.”
Yel’tsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin went to the Ministry of
Defense at 2 a.m. on October 4 to convince the army leadership to storm the
so-called White House (the Russian parliament building), where the anti-
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Yel’tsin opposition had returned after its failure to seize the main television
tower. Grachev insisted on a written order from Yel’tsin indicating Yel’tsin’s
responsibility for the decision to, as Grachev put it, “use tanks in Moscow”
(Baranets, 1997; Korzhakov, 1997; Yel’tsin, 1994).
The decisive factor propelling the army into action was a direct, written
order from Yel’tsin. When asked what it was that eventually moved the mili-
tary leadership, Volkogonov (1993) replied, “the order of the commander-in-
chief, which was given in the presence of the prime minister.” Yel’tsin (“Pres-
ident,” 1993) later reflected, “I took the view that the defense minister should
have acted himself, but he did not. That is why I had to give the order.” When
push came to shove, the military leadership’s unwillingness to be involved in
sovereign power issues was trumped by the responsibility to carry out the
orders of the legitimate head of state.
Contrary to predictions at the time (e.g., Kuz’mishchev, 1993; Odom,
1993), the military’s role in October 1993 did not open the door to more
extensive political involvement in the future. Most officers were appalled by
the need to use the army to settle a domestic political struggle. Marshall
Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov (Dikun, 1993, p. 8), the last Soviet minister of
defense, stated, “A normal officer or soldier regrets that he was drawn into
this conflict and now desires only one thing, that it not be repeated.” The
October 1993 events reinforced existing organizational norms against mili-
tary involvement in sovereign power issues.18
How do the theories discussed above perform in explaining the Russian
army’s role in October 1993? The army was dragged into the political dispute
between Yel’tsin and the Supreme Soviet due to the low political capacity of
the Russian state. The domestic structure approach, then, helps explain why
the armed forces became involved in a domestic political crisis. The October
1993 events were not, however, the classic military coup that this approach
considers likely in periods of political disorder. Latsis (1993, p. 5) noted after
the October events,
The use of the army in internal conflicts is no gift; it signifies the failing of poli-
tics. . . . But, this in principle should not be confused with the intervention of the
army in politics, that is an independent political decision of the military.
The corporate interest approach performs especially poorly. The post-
Soviet Russian army had fared extremely poorly as an organization in its first
few years of existence—to say nothing of during the final years of the Soviet
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period. The political crisis of September-October 1993 could have been
seized as a golden opportunity to promote the military’s interests. Rather
than seeking a larger role in politics, however, the army hoped to avoid any
involvement. In fact, the armed forces supported the contender for power
(Yel’tsin) who was less sympathetic to military corporate interests than the
ex-General Rutskoy. After October 1993, the military’s corporate interests,
in terms of power and resources, have been cut even more than they were in
1992 to 1993.
The organizational structure perspective provides a plausible explanation
for the hesitancy of the military leadership. Grachev (Burbyga, 1993) noted
that one of his key tasks had been preventing a split in the officer corps, sug-
gesting that he considered internal divisions in the army a real problem.
Yel’tsin (“Muzhskoy razgovor,” 1993) also later remarked that the fear of a
split in the army had delayed the storming of the White House. In the final
analysis, however, very few officers openly supported the parliamentary
opposition. Moreover, it was not the case that the army’s key role in October
1993 emboldened the officer corps for further political activity by demon-
strating their capacity for playing a decisive role in sovereign power disputes.
Counterbalancing also was not an issue—the other security forces worked
together with the army in storming the White House.
The organizational culture approach performs particularly well both as an
explanation of the army’s initial unwillingness to play a role in the domestic
power dispute and in its ultimate subordination to civilian authority. The
army had a long tradition of nonintervention and had learned through bitter
experience in the late Soviet period that it should avoid internal missions.
Minister of Defense Grachev’s favorite axiom, “the army is outside politics,”
had been reinforced by events such as the failed August 1991 coup and
heavily promoted within the armed forces. These organizational norms
served as a focal point (Kreps, 1990) that helped orient officer behavior dur-
ing the highly unpredictable situation they faced in September to October
1993. Military hesitation was overcome by a direct written order from the
commander-in-chief, reinforced by the fear of widespread disorder and even
civil war if the army stayed on the sidelines (Dikun, 1993; Leonidov, 1993).
Even so, many officers believed that Grachev had violated organizational
norms against military involvement in politics and expressed their dismay at
the October events (Ball, 1996; Lt.-Gen. [ret.] V. V. Serebryannikov, personal
communication, July 6, 1994; Maj.-Gen. A. V. Tsal’ko, personal communi-
cation, July 28, 1994; Turchenko, 1993). Finally, in terms of counterfactual
analysis, a military that had a tradition of playing the arbiter role (Stepan,
1971) would have been much more likely to insert itself into a sovereign
power dispute between civilian contenders.
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CONCLUSION
Why do the two dominant explanations for military coups in the existing
literature, domestic structure and corporate interest, provide either partially
or completely flawed predictions for Russia? The major reason is because
many scholars have failed to sufficiently delimit the applicability of their the-
ories (King et al., 1994). These explanations often provide compelling
accounts of military behavior, but studying noncoups allows us to see some
other things that might be going on. Officers may be deterred from interven-
ing, despite ample opportunity and motive, by barriers to effective action
within the military itself. These barriers can be either material (organiza-
tional structure), ideational (organizational culture), or both.
Although based on different logics, in this case, rational calculation and
normative restraint reinforced one another. Officer corps norms often will be
central to the calculation of coup plotters. If potential coup makers believe
that they will face widespread military resistance or inactivity because most
officers adhere to a norm of civilian supremacy, and therefore no coup is
attempted, then norms have played an important role. In contrast, in armies
with weak normative constraints against intervention, internal divisions may
actually make the use of force by a military subgroup more likely. Both self-
interested and normative reasons may be present in any particular action, but
this does not mean that norms are not autonomous or important (Elster,
1989).
The behavior of the Russian army in the post-Soviet period shows that
deeply embedded norms can restrain officers from pursuing strategies that
other militaries might adopt. Armies with more permissive organizational
cultures and a tradition of military intervention and rule, on the other hand,
may not show similar restraint. Unfortunately, the process of instilling norms
of nonintervention can often be a lengthy one (see Putnam, 1993). Civilian
elites also do not have complete control over the institutional lessons officers
will draw from previous experiences.19
Does this mean a military coup is impossible in Russia? The field of
Sovietology (and political science in general), after all, is littered with predic-
tions falsified by later events. Analysts (e.g., Kagarlitsky, 2000) have wasted
no time in forecasting that Putin also faces the danger of a military coup.
However, based on the evidence discussed above, a norm of civilian suprem-
acy seems strongly entrenched in the Russian officer corps, despite the politi-
cal tumult of the past 15 years. The two cases of military intervention this
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century took place during periods of state collapse, the 1917 revolution and
the Soviet collapse in 1991. Even in those cases, especially in 1991, support
for intervention was thin and halfhearted. Barring the unlikely scenario of
state collapse, the most likely scenario for military involvement in sovereign
power issues is through military arbitration. Past experience suggests that the
army will try to remain on the sidelines.
Thus military behavior will remain at least partially dependent on the fate
of Russian democracy and the actions of civilian elites. Russia’s democrati-
zation efforts have encountered a host of significant obstacles. A praetorian
military, however, has not been one of them. This fortunate situation has
made it possible both to radically decrease military spending in the face of a
severe budget crunch and to call on the army to repress domestic rebels (as in
October 1993) without the fear that the army would seek political power for
itself. Few observers would describe Russia today as lucky, but at least in this
limited sense it has been fortunate.
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